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Free market reform in New Zealand: an Australian perspective
The defeat of the Shipley National government in 1999 marked the end of a
fifteen-year experiment in which New Zealand governments undertook some of the
most radical free-market reforms every attempted in a developed economy. Although
some of these reforms produced the desired outcome, it is now clear that the reforms
did not produce the results hoped for by their advocates. New Zealand's economic
performance is particularly disappointing when compared to that of Australia, which
faced broadly similar economic problems in the early 1980s and undertook similar,
but signficantly less radical, reforms.
The object of this paper is to assess the New Zealand reforms by contrasting
the reform process and its outcomes with the Australian experience. A range of
explanations for the failure of the New Zealand reforms to produce the anticipated
results are considered and assessed.
Background
The political and economic history of Australia and New Zealand over the past
twenty-five years displays  both remarkable parallels, and important divergences. In
1972, both countries elected social democratic governments led by charismatic
reformers, Gough Whitlam and Norman Kirk. By 1975, the collapse of the long
postwar boom had led to the downfall of labour governments in Australia and New
Zealand. Particularly in Australia, reaction against the failures of the governments of
1972–75 was a major factor in Labour’s subsequent shift to the right. Subsequent
Labour leaders were at pains to present themselves as responsible economic
managers.
The governments that replaced those of Whitlam and Kirk were led by
conservative strongmen: Malcolm Fraser in Australia and Robert Muldoon in New
Zealand. When they took office both men were seen as radical rightwingers, but
from the vantage point of the 1990s, they are usually regarded as highly
interventionist. This view is anachronistic, in that it projects policy concerns of the
1980s on to earlier periods, and misleading, in that the trend of policy under the
Fraser and Muldoon governments was towards deregulation, even if hesitantly and
with frequent reversals (Bollard and Buckle 1987).
The conservatives initially assumed that the economic crisis of the early 1970s
would be resolved by a combination of monetarist macroeconomic policies and a
cut in real wages. The second oil shock of 1979 made it clear that these assumptions
were invalid, but provided a new hope, that of an export-led recovery based on
minerals and energy. The most notable expression of this hope was Muldoon’s
‘Think Big’ program, a set of projects based on the exploitation of natural gas and
other natural resources.
By the early 1980s, it was clear that hopes for an export-led recovery were
misplaced. The booms never eventuated and the projects designed to exploit them
resulted in growth in international debt, particularly in New Zealand. The contrast
between apparently boundless natural resources and poor economic performance
created a widespread sense of disillusionment with the economic policies of the
past. Rising unemployment and slow growth were seen as the outcome of national
economic failings rather than as a part of an economic crisis common to all
developed countries.
The steady decline in the terms of trade for exporters of primary products
presented both countries with economic problems. Particular difficulties were
created for New Zealand, which remained heavily reliant on British export markets
over the postwar period and suffered economic losses when Britain entered the
European Community in 1971. By the end of the 1970s, per capita income in New
Zealand was between 5 and 10 per cent lower than in Australia.
It was against this background that labour governments were elected in
Australia (1983) and New Zealand (1984). Although they had campaigned on fairly
traditional social democratic platforms both of the incoming governments included
influential supporters of the free-market ideas referred to in Australia as ‘economic
rationalism’, and in New Zealand as 'Rogernomics' after its most prominent
advocate, Sir Roger Douglas.
Douglas had expressed his discontent with existing policies in his book
There’s got to be a better way (Douglas 1980). By 1983, drawing on advice from
businessmen and Treasury officials, Douglas had developed a radical free-market
program, which he implemented once in office (Easton 1997a). The Australian
Labor government was more cautious in its embrace of free-market ideas. Moreover
the general dominance of economic rationalism was initially offset by the influence
of the Prices and Incomes Accord, under which unions accepted wage restraint in
return for various social initiatives, such as the reintroduction of a universal system
of health insurance.
Parallel developments in the policy debate were unsurprising in view of the
close links between the economies of Australia and New Zealand. Migration
between Australia and New Zealand has never been significantly restricted and the
Closer Economic Relations agreement signed in 1983 removed most barriers to the
flow of goods. The parallel economic performance of the two countries up to the
1980s is therefore not surprising. The modest divergence in performance over the
1970s could reasonably be explained as a temporary shock, arising from New
Zealand’s greater reliance on the United Kingdom as an export market, and
Australia’s greater endowment of mineral resources, particularly coal and oil.
The surprise was the divergence that took place during the 1980s and 1990s
when GDP per capita in New Zealand fell to a level 25 percent below that prevailing
in Australia. Even more surprisingly, as  Easton and Gerritsen (1996) observe, until
the late 1990s, most international commentary was based on the assumption that
New Zealand's reforms had been highly successful, while Australia was seen to
have suffered because of its less whole-hearted approach to free-market reform.
By the end of the 1990s, however, it was widely agreed that the New Zealand
reforms had failed to produce the expected outcomes. The rapid economic growth of
the early 1990s proved to be little more than a cyclical recovery from the 1989–191
recession, and the renewed onset of recession in 1998 showed that reforms had not,
as some had hoped, eliminated the ‘stop-go’ cycle of boom and bust.
The election in 1999 of a Labour government pledged to roll back some
(though by no means all) of the free-market reforms marked the end of the era of
radical free-market reform. It is, therefore, an appropriate time to consider why the
New Zealand reforms failed to deliver the expected outcomes, and why New
Zealand fell behind Australia in terms of income per capita.
The reforms in Australia and New Zealand
Australia and New Zealand faced similar policy problems, and the policy
agendas put forward by advocates of free-market reforms in the two countries were
very similar. However, differences in the policy process and the random effects of
differences in personalities led to significant differences in policy outcomes
There were obvious parallels between the two labour prime ministers, Hawke
and Lange, and between the radical finance ministers, Douglas and Keating.
However, whereas Lange gave Douglas a free hand in economic policy, Hawke
played a dominant role, at least in the early years of the government. Hawke’s
approach to politics was based on negotiation and consensus, symbolised by the
Summit conference on prices and incomes held shortly after his government took
office. Douglas favored rapid implementation of reforms on a broad front, on the
assumption that when the benefits of reform were evident, popular support would
follow (Douglas 1993).
Structural differences were equally important. Douglas’ authoritarian
approach was made easier by the fact that New Zealand is a unitary state with a
unicameral Parliament.  In Australia, by contrast, national governments have
normally had the support of a reliable majority in the House of Representatives,
elected by constituencies, but not in the Senate, which is elected by a system of
proportional representation. In addition, power is divided between national and state
governments, and all governments are constrained by the constitutional limitations
associated with a federal system.
In both Australia and New Zealand, the labour governments elected in the
1980s were reluctant to apply the logic of free-market reform to sensitive areas
including labour markets, community services and social welfare policy. Partly
because the Australian government survived longer, and partly because its policies
in these areas were more successful, free-market reform in these areas has been
limited in Australia, though there have been significant movements towards
competition and contracting out of service provision. The New Zealand Labour
government failed to address the problems of labour markets and the community
services sector, leaving the way open for the radical reforms of the Bolger National
government. These included the Employment Contracts Act, reductions in social
welfare benefits and a new health system based on consistent application of the
‘purchaser–provider split’.
Outcomes
Assessment of economic performance is always complicated by the need to
choose appropriate comparison periods and appropriate counterfactuals. However,
these difficulties are relatively minor in the present case. The Australian and New
Zealand business cycles have generally been synchronized, with both countries
experiencing severe recessions in the period 1989–91, and subsequent recoveries.
However, the expansion phases in both the 1980s and 1990s were more uneven in
New Zealand than in Australia.
A further difficulty is that the pattern of employment growth differed across
the cycles and between countries. Australia experienced strong employment growth
with relatively weak productivity growth in the 1980s expansion, and the reverse
pattern in the 1990s expansion. In New Zealand, the 1980s was a period of strong
productivity growth and weak employment growth, while the 1990s had strong
employment growth and weak productivity. Advocates of the view that one or other
country's policies were preferable have tended to shift their ground accordingly.
Considering the period since 1983 as a whole, however, Australia's economic
performance has clearly been superior. Australia's GDP per capita grew at an annual
average rate of 2.3 per cent, compared to 1.1 per cent for New Zealand. The result
was that income per capita in New Zealand fell from around around 85 per cent of
the Australian level to around 65 per cent today (based on conversion at current
exchange rates).  Australia displayed higher annual rates of employment growth (2.1
per cent against 0.9 per cent) and productivity growth (1.4 per cent against 0.9 per
cent).
New Zealand’s poor aggregate performance was accompanied by growing
inequality in earnings and a more regressive tax system. Stephens (1998, p19)
concludes ‘Without making any value-judgements, we could say that all measures
of income distribution in New Zealand have widened over the past fifteen years’, a
view consistent with that of Easton (1996). Income inequality also increased in
Australia, but more modestly.
A somewhat more favorable view of the outcome of the New Zealand reforms
may be obtained from a comparison of performance over the reform period since
1984 with relatively poor performance prior to 1984. Evans et al. (1996) examine
GDP per working age adult, and conclude that New Zealand’s growth since 1984
has been superior to that prevailing in the previous seventeen years, and that
performance was particularly strong after the labour market reforms of 1990. This
result is very sensitive to the choice of measure and to the timing of starting and
ending points of the cycle. Similarly, Evans et al. quote the conclusion of Stephens,
Frater and Waldegrave (1995) that relative poverty in New Zealand did not increase
during the reform period, but fail to quote the conclusion that absolute poverty did
increase. The estimates of Evans et al. have been criticised by Dalziel (1998) on this
and other points.
Explanations for failure
Advocates of free-market reform in New Zealand initially expected that their
policies would yield clear benefits within a few years. The disappointing outcomes of
reform in the 1980s were sometimes explained on the basis of a claim that New
Zealand was a ‘basket case’ prior to the introduction of reform. However, although
there were substantial imbalances associated with the Muldoon government's
resistance to devaluation and the ‘Think Big’ policy of resource-based
industrialisation, there were similar imbalances in many European countries.
Moreover, New Zealand’s economic institutions and policies were not radically
different from those of Australia or the OECD as a whole. Arguably, New Zealand’s
trade policies were at the restrictive end of the spectrum, but the ratio of government
expenditure to GDP was not particularly high, and labour markets were less
regulated than in many European countries.
The fifteen years that have elapsed since the reforms began make it
implausible that the policies of the pre-reform era can explain poor performance
since reform. Fifteen years is sufficient time to replace the majority of the capital
stock, even in the absence of the extensive scrappage associated with rapid
structural change. Similarly, most current workers entered the labour force either
during the reform period or shortly before its commencement. It is difficult to see
how current economic performance could be much affected by the trade and fiscal
policies of the 1970s and earlier.
Some advocates of reform have expressed the view that poor economic
outcomes are the result of too little, rather than too much, reform. The slowdown in
reform during the 1990s is interpreted as a result of ‘reform fatigue’, and is regarded
as a failure of resolve rather than as the result of a popular judgement that previous
reforms had failed to deliver the expected benefits. The strongest form of the
‘reform fatigue’ hypothesis is the claim that the reform process was abandoned just
as its benefits were becoming apparent (Kerr 1999). The central focus of this
version of the argument is the economic recovery of 1993–1997 and especially the
‘two good years’ 1994 and 1995, when output grew at annual rates of 5 to 6 per
cent.
The ‘reform fatigue’ argument suffers from severe difficulties. Most
importantly, when the economic experience of the 1990s is viewed as a whole, it is
difficult to reject the hypothesis that the strong growth of 1994 and 1995 was the
usual cyclical expansion that would be expected as part of the recovery from a deep
recession. More generally, if the benefits of a decade of radical reform can be
negated by a modest slowdown in the pace of reform over a few years, it would
seem that the policy program is too fragile to be implemented successfully, at least
in a democracy.
If the ‘basket case’ and ‘reform fatigue’ explanations for New Zealand's poor
performance are rejected, it is necessary to focus on aspects of the reform program
that may have contributed to poor economic performance. Most attention has
focused on monetary policy. Specific decisions of the New Zealand Reserve Bank in
relation to monetary policy, and particularly its reliance, from 1997 to 1999 on a
‘Monetary Conditions Index’ have been criticised as leading to excessive monetary
contraction. More generally, it has frequently been argued that the complete
independence of the Reserve Bank and its exclusive focus on an inflation targets
have led to excessively restrictive policy (Bean 1999).
The financial deregulation of the 1980s has also been criticised. In a number
of countries during the 1980s, financial deregulation led to a speculative boom in
asset prices, and a subsequent slump, but nowhere was the variation in asset prices
more severe than in New Zealand. Easton (1997b) argues that the misidrection of
investment during the boom and the destruction of capital during the slump were
major contributors to New Zealand's subsequent poor economic performance.
A related criticism of financial deregulation stems from the debate on the
sequencing of reform, which has focused on the experience of post-Communist
countries, and, more recently, the Asian financial crisis. Although there is no
consensus on this topic, it is frequently argued that full-scale financial deregulation
should not be undertaken until the process of economic reform is well advanced.
Early financial deregulation, it is argued, is likely to result in speculative excesses,
like those observed in Australia and New Zealand.
External balance
Concern about the ‘stop–-go’ growth associated with periodic balance-of-
payments crises was a feature of the policy debate in Australia and the United
Kingdom as well as New Zealand during the 1960s and 1970s. Support for programs
of free-market reform in all three countries was motivated, at least in part, by the
hope that improvements in microeconomic efficiency would solve the
macroeconomic problem of ‘stop–go’ growth. Advocates of the ‘twin deficits’ theory
also argued that an increase in public sector saving would produce an automatic
reduction in the current account deficit.
Critics of radical reform also focused on problems of external balance. In
particular, Easton (1997b) has argued that New Zealand was successful in
diversifying its export mix between 1966 and 1980, and that subsequent poor
performance is largely due to the adverse impacts of reform on the traded goods
sector. Easton argues that the tight monetary policy and high real interest rates
associated with reform have led to the maintenance of real exchange rates, resulting
in an excessive contraction of the traded goods sector and chronic current account
deficits.
Inappropriate privatisation policies have also contributed to the current
account deficit. Privatisation will generate welfare losses if public assets are sold to
foreign buyers for less than the present value of the future stream of earnings they
would have generated under continued public ownership (Rankin 1995). The loss
takes the form of a net outflow in payments to owners of capital as the profits
accruing to the new owners exceed the interest savings arising from the use of sale
proceeds to repay debt. For example, Kelsey (1997) argues that the sale of Telecom
New Zealand to two American companies for $4.25 billion in 1990 was a bad deal
for the New Zealand public, and that the flow of repatriated profits represents a
permanent burden on the current account. Even allowing for the possibility of more
vigorous competition in future, it seems clear that the profits foregone through the
privatisation of Telecom New Zealand exceed the interest savings from using the
proceeds to repay public debt.
Human, natural and social capital
The arguments presented so far are consistent with the view that the reforms
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s were appropriate, even if mistakes were made
in their design and implementation. However, critics of the reforms such as Kelsey
(1997) and Hazledine (1998) argue that the attempt to replace public provision of
goods and services with market provision is fundamentally misconceived, and
destructive of human, natural and social capital.
These critics focus primarily on microeconomic aspects of the reforms such as
privatisation, and market-oriented reforms in the health, education and welfare
sectors. The attempt to reform the health system is widely recognised as a failure.
Easton (1997a) argues that the purchaser–provider split model, on which the health
reforms was based, rested on the assumption that generic managerial skills, rather
than detailed knowledge about health, were crucial to health system managers.
Easton argues that the lack of health-specific expertise on the part of managers
contributed to the failure of the reforms.
Many writers on economic growth have argued that the development of
human capital through education is a crucial determinant of future economic
performance. In general, however, the advocates of reform in New Zealand either
disregarded human capital, as for example, did Evans et al. (1995) in their
discussion of education reform, or were actively hostile to the concept. The National
government cut education spending from 6.2 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 4.9 per
cent in 1996 and commenced a series of market-oriented reforms based on the
purchaser–provider split model. The reforms were significantly influenced by the
ideas of Maglen (1990) a critic of the human capital model who argued that most
university education consisted of socially unproductive ‘screening’. (This issue is
discussed in more detail by Quiggin (1999).)
The reforms in general and particularly the cuts to social welfare are seen by
Hazledine (1998) as undermining social capital and interpersonal trust. Writers such
as Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) have argued that the preservation of social
capital is crucial to economic and social success in the long run.
An assessment
No single cause appears sufficient to explain the failure of free-market reforms
in New Zealand to yield the expected outcomes. It seems clear that macroeconomic
misjudgements played a major role in the failure to achieve sustained growth during
the 1980s and 1990s. The microeconomic reforms appear to have had, at best, a
modest effect in increasing economic efficiency in the short term, while leading to a
substantial increase in the inequality of income and wealth, which is likely to hamper
growth in the long term. In some important cases, including privatisation and the
reform of the health sector, it seems likely that reform has worsened economic
performance in both the short and the long run.
Even allowing for all these factors, the divergence in economic performance
between Australia and New Zealand since 1980 is surprising and puzzling. One
possible explanation is that the general tendency towards international and inter-
regional convergence in income, evident at least since World War II, has been
replaced by a tendency towards divergence, as liberalised international markets
concentrate wealth in a few ‘global cities’. In the Australasian region, Sydney
appears to have benefited from trends of this kind while other cities have fallen
behind. Within New Zealand, the same phenomenon may be seen on a smaller scale
in Auckland.
If correct, this explanation of the failure of reform would contain a bitter
irony. Few governments have embraced the global free market more eagerly than
the New Zealand governments of the 1980s and 1990s, and few have received more
praise from the advocates of globalisation. However, sentiment counts for nothing in
global markets, whereas the advantages and disadvantages of location seem to be
increasingly important.
Concluding comments
The analysis of economic policy is not an experimental science. It is impossible
to observe the outcomes of particular policies in isolation, without taking account of
the impact of other policies, and of domestic and international shocks.
That said, the New Zealand experience is as close to an experimental test of
radical free-market reform as we are likely to see in a developed country. The
results of the experiment have been very disappointing when compared to the hopes
of the advocates of reform. At most, it could be argued that microeconomic reform
has yielded modest efficiency benefits that have been more than offset by
macroeconomic misjudgements and external shocks.
An assessment of the social impacts of the reforms is beyond the scope of the
present paper. Supporters of the reforms, such as the New Zealand Business
Roundtable, welcome the social changes arising from the reforms, which they see as
creating a more dynamic and enterprising society. Critics, and, it would seem, the
majority of New Zealanders, place more emphasis on the negative effects including
increased inequality and insecurity.
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